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Abstract
A consistent finding in the literature is that anti-dumping (AD) acts as a significant 
barrier to bilateral trade, in particular, during the time such measures are in force. 
Adding to a relatively scarce empirical literature, however, we identify adverse 
impacts of AD which survive well beyond its revocation. More specifically, while 
we cannot rule out a slight post-revocation recovery, we find empirical evidence that 
once affected bilateral trade does not fully recover on average following revocation. 
We use panel data at the Harmonized System four-digit (HS4) level of aggregation 
to produce these results and show that they are robust to the duration of AD cases, 
the time of their imposition and revocation, differentiation by economic sector and 
the nature of imposing countries. Several explanations for our observed empirical 
results seem plausible, and we provide a theoretical framework which suggests our 
results could be driven by market exit or underinvestment of targeted firms.
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1 Introduction
Throughout the last decades, the world has witnessed significant and ongoing 
changes in the landscape of international trade policy. While regular tariffs continue 
to be the most powerful trade barrier in force, their average has fallen considera- 
bly. This is true at the global level following several rounds of multilateral trade 
negotiations through the auspices of the GATT/WTO but also regionally owing to 
the contemporary growth of regional trade agreement (RTAs).1 Running counter to 
this development, however, is the proliferation of alternative forms of trade protec-
tion with anti-dumping (AD) being among the most prominent ones (Prusa 2005; 
Bown 2011; Kee et al. 2013; Niu et al. 2018). At least two characteristics distinguish 
AD from other trade impediments. First, unlike regular tariffs and countervailing 
duties which are both country- and product-specific, AD measures are country- and 
firm-specific and, with this, a trade policy initiative targeted at selected foreign com-
petitors. Second, although in practice there is legal scope for temporal extension, 
Article 11.3 of the 1994 Anti-Dumping Agreement mandates that AD should be ter-
minated no later than five years after its imposition, making it a temporary trade 
barrier by definition.2
Recently, the widespread use of AD under the Trump Administration has 
attracted strong public attention. In 2018 alone, the United States filed 34 AD inves-
tigations and introduced 41 new AD duties (compared to annual averages of 29 and 
19, respectively, between 1995 and 2017), mainly towards China which responded 
with retaliatory measures (WTO 2019). The heated dispute between the two giants 
has rocked the pillars of the global trading system and the long-term consequences 
for world trade are as of yet unpredictable.
AD, however, is not a phenomenon of recent times but has a strong record of 
both practical utilization and academic assessment. Figure 1 illustrates the extent 
of its global use with respect to annually filed investigations and newly introduced 
measures between 1996 and 2018. While AD has long been the playground for only 
a small number of usual suspects, mainly Australia, Canada, the European Union 
(EU), and the United States, the extensive increase in its use at the global level 
from the 1990s and onwards, nevertheless, is mainly attributable to so-called “new 
heavy users”, a group of emerging market economies (Bown 2008). There remains 
significant scholarly discourse over the underlying causes of this rise. While AD 
finds legitimization in the legal framework of the WTO if applied in order to pre-
vent or offset “unfair” price setting in international trade relations, an early lit-
erature instead links administered protection in the multilateral trading system to 
1 Globally, the effectively applied (trade-weighted) average tariff fell from about 6% in 1990 to 2.3% in 
2018 (World Bank 2019).
2 The Anti-Dumping Agreement governs the application of GATT Article VI and spells out the legal 
scope and practical application of AD policy in the multilateral trading system.
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macroeconomic conditions (e.g., Takacs 1981; Magee and Leslie 1987; Grilli 1988; 
Leidy 1997). This literature suggests that the use of AD increases with macroeco-
nomic weakness, a characteristic it shares with standard trade policy tools such as 
tariff barriers.
The empirical literature also finds evidence of blunt protectionist drivers of AD, 
including trade policy substitution (e.g., Feinberg and Reynolds 2007; Bown and 
Tovar 2011; Moore and Zanardi 2011; Ketterer 2016; Silberberger and Stender 2018; 
Kuenzel 2020) or retaliatory motives (e.g., Blonigen and Bown 2003; Feinberg 
and Reynolds 2006), and the utilization of AD as a means of industrial policy 
(e.g., Leipziger and Shin 1991; Konings and Vandenbussche 2005; Konings and 
Vandenbussche 2008). In the ongoing China-US trade conflict, moreover, Bown 
(2019) notes the United States’ frustration about WTO rules not being sufficiently 
flexible to curb China’s policy-induced export expansion, a circumstance which 
eventually called for policy action in the form of AD. More recently, evidence 
presented by Bown et al. (2021) also suggests a relationship between US electoral 
swing-state politics and AD.3
Fig. 1  Anti-dumping in numbers, 1996-2018
3 There is evidence that AD may even be applied as a strategic policy tool against footloose domestic 
multinational firms. For example, Collie and Vandenbussche (2005) show that governments use this form 
of import protection to prevent their domestic multinationals from outsourcing (part of their) production 
to a non-unionized location abroad with the aim of exploiting differences in flexibility of labor costs and 
to serve their country from a distance.
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While the application of AD may have legitimate motives in some cases, argua-
bly, few researchers and policy makers would take notice of AD if it mainly followed 
its actual purpose to drive out predatory dumping. The growing perception about the 
de facto determinants of AD, however, has prompted Tabakis and Zanardi (2019) 
[p. 2] to conclude that “predatory motives are absent in most AD cases, and the 
introduction of AD measures does not hinge upon them”. Similarly, Nelson (2006) 
[p. 554] notes that “most trade that satisfies the legal definition of dumping has 
no harmful effects and, for those few instances that might be generally harm- 
ful, the existing legal frameworks that could be applied are more disciplined with 
respect to market consistency. The AD mechanism, by contrast, is really about 
neither fairness nor predation”.
The proliferation of AD has led to a large body of empirical literature on the 
(short- to medium-run) trade impact of AD measures and researchers have consist-
ently documented a significant and negative impact of AD on the intensive margin 
of affected bilateral trade at the sectoral level (e.g., Staiger and Wolak 1994; Prusa 
1997; Brenton 2001; Konings et  al. 2001; Prusa 2001; Durling and Prusa 2006; 
Ganguli 2008; Park 2009). While Devault (1996) finds that the mark-up on import 
prices resulting from the imposition of AD measures is associated with consumer 
losses largely exceeding the gain in producer surplus, evidence for aggregate trade 
and welfare effects associated with AD remains generally mixed (e.g., Vanden-
bussche and Zanardi 2010; Egger and Nelson 2011).4 More recently, the avail-
ability of firm-level data has encouraged empirical analyses on targeted exporters’ 
reaction to AD, confirming a substantial decrease in trade with imposing countries 
while being subject to the trade impediment (e.g., Chandra and Long 2013; Lu 
et  al. 2013, Chandra 2016; Chandra 2019; Jabbour et  al. 2019; Felbermayr and 
Sandkamp 2020).
Although of equally high relevance from a trade policy perspective, a topic 
that has received only marginal academic attention to date concerns the long-term 
impact of AD, in particular the effect upon the pattern of trade after the removal 
of such measures. This paper, therefore, aims to bridge this gap in the literature 
by assessing whether AD measures affect trade values (negatively) exclusively 
while being in force, i.e., in merely a temporary manner, or instead induce last-
ing negative implications on affected bilateral trade even after their revocation. 
Insights from our research may be considered important not only with regard to 
the appropriately targeted implementation of trade policy, but they also add to an 
understanding of the potential long-term consequences of the extensive utiliza-
tion of AD.
To the best of our knowledge, there are only two previous empirical papers 
which directly address the post-revocation effects of AD on trade flows. Bown 
(2013) analyzes a total of 746 cases which were imposed and removed across 
4 See Blonigen and Prusa (2016) for a comprehensive literature review on the trade effects associated 
with AD.
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fourteen G20 member countries between 1992 and 2008. He finds that exports 
(sectoral volumes and shares alike) of previously targeted countries experience 
an immediate bounce in trade once being relieved from the trade impediment. 
China’s export performance, in particular, is found to adjust comparatively 
quickly and aggressively to improving market conditions. With the exception 
of China, however, targeted countries seem to be unable to re-establish pre- 
intervention export levels to imposing countries, indicating long-run costs asso-
ciated with AD.
While Bown (2013) offers no clear explanation for the post-revocation effects, 
Sandkamp (2020) suggests that targeted firms raise their prices as a result of 
the AD imposition. Using trade data for the accession countries of the EU 2004 
enlargement and 35 exporting countries between 1999 and 2009, the author pre-
sents empirical evidence that AD measures lead to an increase in import prices of 
affected products and, with this, a reduction in import quantities. In particular, esti-
mated price adjustments remain almost constant even after the trade impediment 
has been formally withdrawn, suggesting that AD duties have a price effect beyond 
their revocation. While affected bilateral trade is estimated to resume slightly over 
time, it does not reach the levels that would be expected when ascribing a merely 
short-lived (i.e., while being in force) impact to AD. One possible explanation 
could be that targeted firms use an upward price adjustment to avoid the renewed 
imposition of AD in the future.
In a related literature, Besedes and Prusa (2017) provide empirical evidence 
on the long-term effects of AD on the extensive margin of trade. Using quarterly 
US firm-level data, the authors estimate the hazard rate of exports to the United 
States, and find that firms from AD targeted countries are less likely (by some 
22%) to return to the US market even after the removal of the trade impediment. 
According to the authors, this could be due to the fear of exporters facing another 
AD measure after re-entry.
Our contribution deviates from the three papers above in many respects. First, 
we employ a gravity-inspired panel data model that allows us to control for various 
forms of unobserved heterogeneity, and extend both the period of investigation to 
more recent years (from 1991 to 2014), and the number of AD imposing coun-
tries, including both developed and developing countries. Second, while the three 
papers above focus on specific imposing countries (i.e., a number of G20 mem-
ber countries, the accession countries of the EU 2004 enlargement, and the United 
States, respectively), they remain short on providing more generally valid empirical 
insights on post-revocation trade relations. Third, our analysis allows for a specific 
break-down of results by case duration, the time of their imposition and revocation, 
economic sector, and imposing countries, and finally, to our knowledge, we are the 
first to construct explicit micro-foundations for the observed long-run effects of 
AD. Our firm-level theoretical model suggests persistent effects of AD beyond its 
revocation due to either impediments to firm re-entry or due to insufficient invest-
ment in fixed costs such as marketing, distribution and storage while the AD duty is 
in force. The protection afforded to the domestic sector and its resultant expansion 
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in the imposing country makes it hard for targeted firms to operate, and they will 
thus either exit or operate at a permanently lower scale.
Our empirical analysis uses trade values at the product-level while our theoreti-
cal framework constructs firm-level micro-foundations. Given this discrepancy, our 
theoretical model should therefore not be regarded as providing precise identifica-
tion for our empirical methodology. Instead, while employing firm-level data would 
be a welcome way to directly test the hypotheses emerging from the theory, it would 
be difficult (if not impossible) to construct internationally comparable data, and as 
such, any firm-level dataset is likely to be restricted to a single country. Our product-
level dataset, by contrast, has the advantage of being able to increase our data points, 
and provide more generally applicable results.
Summarizing our empirical findings, we document a previously well-observed 
trade-destroying effect of AD on the imports from targeted countries while such 
measures are in force. In addition, however, we identify a lasting negative effect on 
affected bilateral trade which survives well beyond the revocation of AD. Using panel 
data aggregated at the HS4 product-level, our estimations are robust to the heteroge-
neity stemming from various panel data dimensions, and the persistence of adverse 
trade effects seems to be inherent regardless of the duration of AD measures, the 
time of their imposition and revocation, economic sector and the nature of imposing 
countries.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide a 
detailed introduction to the data and a description of our methodology. Section  3 
presents the main results and discusses various extensions. Then, in Section  4, 
we derive an explicit micro-founded theoretical model to provide intuition for our 
empirical findings. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2  Data and Methodology
2.1  Data
We extract data on AD cases for a bilateral panel of 31 imposing × 30 targeted coun-
tries from the World Bank’s Global Anti-dumping Database (GAD) collected by 
Bown (2015) and merge these with a full set of annual HS4 bilateral imports in 
value and trade-weighted effectively applied tariffs, taken from the United Nations 
’ (2019) Comtrade and the World Bank ’s (2019) World Integrated Trade Solutions 
(WITS) databases, respectively.5 While the majority of AD cases recorded in the 
GAD is assigned to lower levels of aggregation than HS4, a few cases have occa-
sionally been reported only for the latter. This concerns frequent users of AD, such 
as Canada, the United States, and most notably Mexico, but also “important” eco-
nomic sectors including steel. Avoiding the risk of imprecise data imputation, we are 
therefore hesitant to lay out our analysis at more disaggregated commodity levels. 
5 We use trade and tariff data reported at WITS’s “combined” HS nomenclature which takes account of 
and combines the several historical HS-revision rounds.
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Please note that our aggregation of trade and, with this, of AD cases at the HS4 digit 
level means that we tend to underestimate the impact of AD on trade because not all 
of the products at deeper levels of disaggregation were necessarily subject to the AD 
imposition.
Not only are the selected countries the most frequent users of AD but also the 
main targets. The overall time period under consideration is 1991-2014, and some 
82% of total global AD activity during the last two decades involve our country-pairs. 
For several imposing countries, however, AD is not reported from as early as 1991, 
either due to data constraints or because the imposing country did not employ AD 
policies before this time. China, for instance, implemented its AD law only in 1997 
(Zanardi 2004). We refer the reader to Table 9 in the Appendix for the list of coun-
tries in our sample and their initial year of observation. Mirroring that AD is imposed 
selectively on foreign firms, only 0.9% of the country-pair-product (triadic) clusters 
considered are actually affected by AD at some point in our sample period.
The GAD categorizes AD cases into preliminary or final measures. For the pur-
poses of our empirical analysis, we do not distinguish between the two. There are 
both advantages and disadvantages to our approach. On the one hand, the gener-
alization does not allow for a separate analysis of preliminary and final measures, 
respectively, on bilateral trade. On the other hand, nevertheless, the majority of 
preliminary AD measures feature a seamless transition into final duties so that an 
analysis of the post-revocation trade effects of preliminary duties is conceptually 
not feasible. Moreover, exclusive focus on final AD measures would distort pre-
cise identification of post-revocation trade effects due to the potential omission of 
preceding trade impediments. In this regard, there is empirical evidence of a nearly 
identical impact of preliminary and final AD measures on trade flows (Staiger and 
Wolak 1994). Besedes and Prusa (2017) even find that the strongest trade-destroy-
ing effects of AD on exporting firms occur during the investigation and preliminary 
phases.
Our full dataset covers a total of 3,791 HS4 AD cases, divided into four groups: 
(1) those that were initiated prior to 1991 and were still in force beyond 2014, (2) 
those that were initiated prior to 1991 and revoked before 2014, (3) those that were 
initiated in or after 1991 and were still in force beyond 2014, and finally (4) those 
that were initiated in or after 1991 and revoked before 2014. For empirical analysis, 
we apply three distinct restrictions to the data.
First, since the focus of our research is on post-revocation bilateral trade, we 
restrict attention to cases which were terminated no later than 2010. As such, we 
remove cases (and their corresponding triadic time series) with a termination date 
after 2010. This leaves us with at least four years (i.e., 16.7% of observations 
within each triadic time series) of post-revocation observations for each AD case. 
Second, we exclude triadic time series with more than one HS4 AD case in our 
sample period as temporal proximity would not allow isolating post-revocation 
effects from previous cases. Third, in order to properly estimate the effect of AD 
on bilateral trade while such measures are in force, we consider only those cases 
installed after the initial year of observation for triads.
All three restrictions truncate the number of sample AD cases to 1,219. We 
present these cases by duration in dataset-years in Table  1 where we define a 
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dataset-year as a year in which a duty was in force, even if this were not the case 
in the full calendar year. As can be seen, case duration does not follow a normal 
but instead a trimodal distribution. More specifically, we note a far right-sided ter-
tiary peak of 117 cases with a duration of 16 years in our censored sample, with 
Mexico alone accounting for 113. Remarkably, all of these Mexican AD measures 
were installed from 1993 onwards. This coincides with previous evidence on rock-
eting Mexican AD activity in 1993 such as Francois and Niels (2003) and Niels and 
Ten Kate (2004), the former giving Mexico’s real exchange rate appreciation as one 
possible explanation for this increase.
Table 2 reports the ten most frequent AD users within our sample, which account 
for 84.2% of all cases alone. The group counts the four traditional (Australia, 
Canada, the EU, and the United States) and a number of new (e.g., Argentina, 
Brazil, India, Mexico, and South Africa) AD users. While the United States heads 
the list with 190 cases, in light of the figures discussed in Table  1, it does not 
come as a surprise to find Mexico standing out in terms of mean case duration 
(of 13.4 years).
Table 1  Frequency of HS4 anti-dumping cases in sample by duration, 1991–2014
Duration in years refers to dataset-years. Preliminary AD measures are included in the calculation. AD 
data based on countries considered for empirical analysis (see Section 2 for details). See text for details 
on data editing. Own calculation based on data from Bown (2015)





















Mean in years 6.4
Median in years 6
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2.2  Estimation Strategy
For econometric implementation, we employ a simple gravity-inspired panel data 
model. The baseline model specification reads as follows:
where ln (Mijkt ) represents country i’s logarithmized imports from j in HS4 product 
k in period t expressed in current US Dollars, ijkt denotes the error term, and 0 is 
a constant. In view of ample empirical evidence on the determining impact of tar-
iff liberalization on AD policy (see Section 1), we consider the lagged ad-valorem 
trade-weighted effectively applied tariff rate of i towards j in k ( tijkt−1 ) as a control 
variable.
While both imposition and revocation decisions of AD are highly endogenous, 
they are virtually impossible to be instrumented appropriately in any empirical 
model. For this reason, alongside controlling for unobserved heterogeneity among 
triads ( ijk ), we include importer-year-product ( itk ) and exporter-year-product fixed 
effects ( jtk ), respectively, to account for unobserved demand and supply shocks 
(Felbermayr and Sandkamp 2020) or, more generally, multilateral trade resistance 
following Baier and Bergstrand (2007). Lastly, we use importer-exporter-year fixed 
effects ( ijt ) to absorb time-specific bilateral variation, including exchange rate vola-
tility or RTAs membership.
Our interest lies in the estimation of the trade impact of an AD measure’s transi-
tion from its status of being in force to being revoked. We therefore include in equa-
tion (1) two policy dummy variables. In order to test the immediate impact of AD 
on affected bilateral trade, we define the dummy variable AD , which equals unity for 
(1)
ln (Mijkt ) =  0 + 1 ADijkt + 2 Ωijkt + 3 ln ( 1 + tijkt−1 )
+ ijk + ijt + itk + jtk + ijkt,
Table 2  Most frequent HS4 anti-dumping users in sample, 1991–2014
Duration in years refers to dataset-years. Preliminary AD measures are included in the calculation. AD 
data based on countries considered for empirical analysis (see Section 2 for details). See text for details 
on censored sample. Own calculation based on data from Bown (2015)
Imposing country Number of cases Mean duration in years
United States 190 5.2
Mexico 159 13.4




South Africa 89 6.6
Australia 79 5.3
Brazil 42 6.4
Korea, Rep. 40 5.1
Total 1,026 6.7
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all in-force years of an AD measure imposed by i towards j in product k, and zero 
otherwise. Drawing on the evidence across previous empirical literature, we expect 
a negative coefficient.
In order to assess the long-term implications of AD on affected bilateral trade, we 
specify the dummy variable Ω , which equals unity for all years following the revoca-
tion year of a previously installed AD measure of i towards j in product k, and zero 
otherwise.6 Owing to the simultaneous incorporation of AD , the coefficient of Ω 
indicates the change in imports identified by the dummy relative to all years prior to 
the imposition of the trade impediment. While statistical insignificance would gen-
erally point towards restored pre-intervention trade values, a positive sign implies 
a boost in bilateral trade after AD has been removed. A negative sign, by contrast, 
suggests lasting negative implications of AD on affected bilateral trade.
An alternative empirical strategy to analyze the temporal effects of AD on bilateral 
trade compared to employing dummy variables would be to consider AD duties more 
explicitly, for instance by means of a variable that measures the precise amount of the 
imposed import tax rate. There are, however, several caveats speaking against this. 
First, while the majority of AD measures involve ad-valorem duties which are easy 
to quantify, the specific type of AD may still vary widely across cases encompassing 
also suspension agreements, price undertaking from exporters, or duties becoming 
due only if export prices fall under a certain threshold, which makes consistent incor-
poration difficult. Second, while we use the most comprehensive database currently 
available for obtaining bilateral AD information, even for ad-valorem measures there 
are numerous missing or inconsistent data entries. Lastly, as our main interest lies 
in the transition of bilateral AD measures from being in force to being revoked, one 
would find strictly zero ad-valorem duties once a measure had been revoked, which 
yields no further informational value when incorporated continuously instead of in a 
binary way.
More generally, we acknowledge the relevance of assessing both in-force and 
post-revocation trade effects across the different types of AD listed above. In this 
context, Sandkamp and Yalcin (2021) find that export values and quantities are 
adversely affected by AD regardless of the actual type of duty, but there are nuanced 
differences as to the effect each type of AD duty might have: ad-valorem duties 
reduce exports more effectively than specific duties and those that are active only 
below price thresholds. Our aggregation of binary AD information at the HS4 level, 
however, means that there could potentially be multiple cases at deeper levels of 
disaggregation that might differ by type, thus making any meaningful comparison 
across types more challenging.
6 As AD may be revoked at any time in a year, we have alternatively coded Ω to unity in the year of 
revocation of the duty and all following years. The estimates of this robustness exercise are nearly identi-
cal to the ones reported (results are available upon request).
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3  Estimation Results
3.1  Baseline Results
Table 3 presents our baseline estimation results. We first report estimations when 
including only the in-force dummy variable in column (1), and then expand the 
model by including the post-revocation dummy variable in column (2), and addi-
tionally controlling for applied tariffs in column (3). All estimations are performed 
with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), and coefficient estimates are consistently statis-
tically significant at least at the 0.1% level.7
Our estimations (expectedly) bring to light a trade-destroying effect of AD on 
the imports from targeted countries while such measures are in force. Confirming 
previous literature, the finding is robust to all three model set-ups. Adding to this 
well-researched nexus, we further find a negatively signed coefficient estimate of the 
post-revocation dummy variable in columns (2) and (3). Recall that the interpreta-
tion of Ω uses the pre-intervention phase of AD as reference period. Given the trade-
destroying effect of AD while such measures are in force, our findings thus suggest 
that once affected bilateral trade does not fully recover on average following revoca-
tion to its pre-intervention level. Conversely, the level reduction in bilateral trade 
experienced during the imposition phase appears to survive well beyond the revoca-
tion of AD duties. More specifically, based on the statistically significant coefficient 
Table 3  Baseline estimation results
Asterisks denote the level of statistical significance with *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, and † 
p<0.1. Robust, clustered (at the country-pair-product level) standard errors in parentheses. Country-pair-
product, country-pair-year, and country-year-product fixed effects always included but not reported
(1) (2) (3)






Constant 11.91∗∗∗ 11.91∗∗∗ 12.51∗∗∗
(5.48e-05) (0.000159) (0.00504)




1 = 2 (p-value) 0.0028 0.0019
7 To confirm the robustness of our findings, we have also experimented with various fixed effects speci-
fications yielding similar coefficients to those reported (results are available upon request).
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estimates in columns (2) through (3), we find that average post-revocation bilateral 
trade is below pre-intervention phase values by roughly 27.5%.8
We note here, however, our finding is not inconsistent with either a modest recov-
ery, stagnation or even a further decline in trade values following revocation. Sup-
pose, for instance, that trade values while exposed to an AD duty were subject to 
gradual decline, followed by a gradual and modest recovery after revocation. In fact, 
trade path determination depends on the sizes of coefficients of both AD and Ω , and 
setting off their magnitudes against one another indeed suggests a slight bouncing-
back to pre-intervention trade values. We provide additional grounding for this inter-
pretation in the form of hypothesis tests at the bottom end of Table  3. Rejecting 
equality of coefficients between AD and Ω at all of the standard significance levels 
for the models in columns (2) and (3) suggests that affected imports seem to react 
differently to the imposition of AD compared to its aftermath. Based on our (nega-
tively signed) estimates, however, such recovery does not on average translate into 
post-revocation trade values reaching pre-intervention levels, at least not within the 
period under investigation.
This view is further supported in Table 4 where we present estimation results for 
year-specific post-revocation effects. More specifically, both columns report sepa-
rate coefficient estimates for Ω specified for the first, second, third, and remaining 
residual post-revocation years. Given the unbalanced panel character of our dataset, 
we code dummy variables according to consecutive dataset-years and actual years 
in columns (1) and (2), respectively. Notably, while (negatively signed) magnitudes 
of their coefficients decrease over the initial three years following revocation there 
is no indication of pre-intervention trade values being restored entirely. In fact, the 
convergence process following the immediate bounce back appears to even slow 
down over time.
Hence, we cannot rule out a modest level of convergence, yet given that our 
results consistently demonstrate that on average post-revocation trade values remain 
below pre-intervention levels, we interpret this as evidence of the long-run costs 
associated with AD. The adverse trade effects of AD occurring during in-force 
phases do not seem to be compensated entirely. In Section 4, we will provide a for-
malized intuition that this lasting adverse impact of AD is explained by barriers to 
re-entry or the lack of investment in fixed costs in the imposing country by the tar-
geted firm.
3.2  Differentiation by Case Duration
According to WTO law, more specifically Article 11.3 of the 1994 Anti-dumping 
Agreement, AD measures should be terminated no later than five years after their 
imposition. In practice, however, this regulatory limitation is not enforced rigor-
ously as is apparent from the variation in case duration in Table 1. Case duration 
8 Marginal trade effects are calculated using (e𝛽 − 1) × 100 transformation.
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exceeding five years could have two underlying mechanics. First, while imposing 
countries may not only introduce preliminary duties while AD petitions are still 
under investigation, they are also given the opportunity to request temporary exten-
sion of final measures for another (maximum) of five years. A priori, it appears 
reasonable to assume that the post-revocation effect on bilateral trade differs with 
respect to the duration of AD. More specifically, trade relations affected through a 
comparatively longer time span could reveal a higher probability of producing last-
ing negative long-term implications. Longer imposition phases may provide targeted 
firms with a stronger economic incentive to shift their export activities to other des-
tinations and foster those new trade relations while being subject to AD. Second, 
deterrence effects intuitively seem to become more pronounced the longer once 
imposed AD measures had been in place.
In Table 5, we therefore test for differences across case duration categories. To 
this end, we interact both the AD and post-revocation policy dummy variables with 
an indicator for case duration up to the median in our sample, i.e., six years, in col-
umn (1). Using this threshold, we note that the negative and significant coefficients 
Table 4  Estimation results for subdivided post-revocation effects
Asterisks denote the level of statistical significance with *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, and † 
p<0.1. Robust, clustered (at the country-pair-product level) standard errors in parentheses. Country-pair-







          First year −0.339∗∗∗ −0.339∗∗∗
(0.0510) (0.0510)
          Second year −0.308∗∗∗ −0.296∗∗∗
(0.0503) (0.0501)
          Third year −0.277∗∗∗ −0.273∗∗∗
(0.0524) (0.0512)










1 = 2,1 = 2,2 0.0165 0.0090
= 2,3 = 2,4 (p-value)
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on both the AD and post-revocation dummy variables that we found above remain, 
and we find no statistically significant deviation for cases with a duration below the 
median. This suggests that the adverse long-run trade effects seem to be inherent in 
AD regardless of the temporal dimension of the trade impediment.
We provide additional evidence in support of this conclusion in column (2) by 
comparing particularly short cases (up to three years) and particularly long cases 
(more than 12 years) with average effects. Notably, however, we find a statistically 
significant smaller in-force effect of short-lived AD cases. While this comes as a 
surprise, an explanation could be that targeted firms are unlikely to abandon existing 
trade relations precipitously, for instance due to running orders, but instead rather 
phase them out gradually. That is, the negative implications of AD might be vis-
ible only after orders have been fully supplied. Also, shorter cases in our sample 
naturally comprise a large share of preliminary measures which have either been 
Table 5  Estimation results by case duration
Asterisks denote the level of statistical significance with *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, and † 
p<0.1. Robust, clustered (at the country-pair-product level) standard errors in parentheses. Country-pair-






          < 7 years 0.0694
(0.101)
          < 4 years 0.249∗∗
(0.0889)




          < 7 years −0.131
(0.103)
          < 4 years 0.0797
(0.0886)
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withdrawn at an early stage or found unjustified based on the investigation under-
taken by national AD authorities, thereby presumably before entirely unfolding their 
impact on affected trade relations.
3.3  Differentiation by Time of Imposition and Revocation
We also extend our analysis to the differentiation of AD measures by the time of 
their (first) imposition and revocation. On the former, the global financial crisis 
could have provoked a stronger and more aggressive targeting of market competi-
tors (Bown 2009), potentially leading to more pronounced trade effects of AD while 
being in force and a stronger propensity for permanent damage to trade relations 
beyond its revocation.
In a similar vein, we speculate that particularly the post-revocation effects of AD 
on bilateral trade values might have been different for cases that started or ended 
during the 1990s compared to those in more recent years. Our expectation rests on 
the fact that post-1990s trade has seen trade relations being increasingly integrated 
in global value chains (GVCs). In this context, Bown et al. (2020) find that domestic 
value-added growth in foreign production is significantly associated with a higher 
probability of removing AD duties. While our above findings by case duration give 
no indication that the swift removal of AD leads to comparatively milder adverse 
trade effects for both in-force and post-revocation periods, countries involved in 
previous bilateral trade disputes could still re-establish cross-country collaboration 
quicker when there is a need of maintaining efficient production networks. Proxying 
for the prosperity of GVCs, it is thus possible that the adverse post-revocation trade 
effects of AD are less persistent for cases which started or ended in more recent 
years.9
The estimation results for probing these two hypotheses are shown in Table 6. In 
column (1), we interact AD and Ω with a dummy indicator capturing the imposition 
of AD measures during or shortly after the global financial crisis. Estimations reveal 
nevertheless that accompanying economic turmoils have not accentuated further the 
trade affects of AD compared to previous years.
Columns (2) and (3) show estimations incorporating an interaction on the impo-
sition and revocation of AD measures, respectively, in the years between 2000 and 
2010. As can be seen, there is no indication of heterogeneity of the post-revocation 
effects of AD across decades, thereby rejecting our assumption that particularly the 
latter might be less pronounced for more recently revoked cases. In contrast, we find 
a positive deviation of the in-force effect for cases that were imposed in more recent 
years. While the overall effect of AD is still negative, this could point towards initial 
adherence to existing trade relations in view of maintenance of GVCs.
9 Please note that our sample only includes AD cases that were terminated before or in 2010 (see Sec-
tion 2 for details). Later imposition years thus restrict case duration.
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3.4  Differentiation by Economic Sector
We further investigate whether there is any indication of heterogeneous effects 
across economic sectors. More specifically, AD has a long-lasting and privileged 
relationship with steel sectors. Durling and Prusa (2006), in this context, very aptly 
name the flood of AD measures imposed on hot-rolled steel trade between 1996 and 
2001 an “AD epidemic” in their paper. Not only are many high income countries, 
such as Germany or the United States, home to long-established steel producing and 
processing industries which regularly call for protection from global competition 
but, moreover, according to the authors, hot-rolled steel in particular is a relatively 
homogeneous product that nearly all steel firms can produce. A highly competitive 
world market could thus make trade protection remunerative.
A descriptive look at our sample used for estimation confirms this devotion of 
AD policy to the steel sectors. In fact, the product most affected in our sample is 
HS4 code 7210 (“Flat-rolled products of iron or non-alloy steel”). Among the top-
ten HS4 affected products we have a total of six falling into steel.
Table 6  Estimation results by time of imposition and revocation
Asterisks denote the level of statistical significance with *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, and † 
p<0.1. Robust, clustered (at the country-pair-product level) standard errors in parentheses. Country-pair-
product, country-pair-year, and country-year-product fixed effects always included but not reported
Imposition Revocation
in/after global financial 
crisis
in recent years in recent years
(1) (2) (3)
AD −0.435∗∗∗ −0.585∗∗∗ −0.393∗∗
(0.0455) (0.0657) (0.150)
          2007–2010 −0.230
(0.186)
          2000–2010 0.252∗∗ −0.0349
(0.0868) (0.157)
Post-revocation −0.326∗∗∗ −0.437∗∗∗ −0.472∗∗∗
(0.0457) (0.0667) (0.122)
          2007–2010 0.158
(0.183)
          2000–2010 0.141 0.173
(0.0863) (0.129)
Tariff −0.594∗∗∗ −0.594∗∗∗ −0.594∗∗∗
(0.0687) (0.0687) (0.0687)
Constant 12.51∗∗∗ 12.51∗∗∗ 12.51∗∗∗
(0.00504) (0.00504) (0.00504)





The Aftermath of Anti‑Dumping: Are Temporary Trade Barriers…
Given the documented preference of countries to impose AD in steel sec-
tors, international steel trade is thus associated with a high risk of recurring AD. 
It is therefore likely that once targeted exporters’ fear of re-imposed AD measures 
is stronger here relative to other sectors. This fear in turn might produce a more 
pronounced reluctance to revive once affected trade relations after the revocation 
of AD, due to increased uncertainty. By contrast, some 53% of all HS4 AD cases 
affecting metal sectors in our sample have been initiated by Canada, the EU, and the 
United States combined. All three can be regarded as internationally important steel 
processing markets, and targeted firms might be reluctant to giving up (entirely) 
established export destinations. This motivation could be relevant especially to 
emerging market economies such as China and Brazil, which rank first (38 cases) 
and second (31 cases), respectively, as targets sharing places with the EU (29 cases) 
and followed closely by Japan (28 cases).
Against this background, we run separate regressions of metal (HS2 72–83) ver-
sus non-metal sectors. Estimation results are presented in Table 7 where we gener-
ally find negatively signed and highly statistically significant coefficient estimates 
for our in-force and post-revocation dummy variables, regardless of economic sector 
affiliation. Following the interpretation put forward in our baseline results, estima-
tion results suggest AD -induced long-run effects on trade across economic sectors. 
By implication, targeted steel firms do thus not react generally differently to the AD 
burden than exporters in other sectors. That being said, however, we find nearly 
twice as large (negatively signed) coefficient estimates for both policy dummy vari-
ables and applied tariffs across metal compared to non-metal sectors. This finding 
could reflect a comparatively higher sensitivity of metal trade towards trade policy 
Table 7  Estimation results by economic sector
Estimations based on sample splits (see text for details). Asterisks denote the level of statistical signifi-
cance with *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, and † p<0.1. Robust, clustered (at the country-pair-prod-
uct level) standard errors in parentheses. Country-pair-product, country-pair-year, and country-year-prod-
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changes, but it could also hint towards larger average AD duties and regular tariffs in 
these sectors.
3.5  Differentiation by Imposing Country
Lastly, we speculate that AD could have heterogeneous long-term implications on 
affected bilateral trade, depending on the nature of the imposing country. Zanardi 
(2004), in this respect, illustrates that various middle income countries have adopted 
AD laws only recently compared to traditional users of AD. As is observable also in 
the data used for the empirical part of this paper, the newly discovered trade policy 
tool has since been used extensively by this group of countries. Not only does this 
imply that AD behavior between traditional and new users differs substantially, but 
Vandenbussche and Zanardi (2010) also provide empirical evidence that the adverse 
effects of the exhaustive utilization are not merely specific to affected sectors. Instead, 
the authors estimate that AD chills aggregate import volumes of new heavy users 
(among them Brazil, India, and Mexico) by almost 6%. In view of jeopardizing (more 
cost-effective) imports beyond the policy intervention, especially for this latter group 
of countries, insights of the post-revocation trade effects of AD bear important impli-
cations for their future use of this trade impediment.
One might also assume that the response of targeted exporters to AD varies, 
depending on the attractiveness or importance of the imposing country’s market. 
Briefly explained, trade relations might be more likely to resume to pre-intervention 
levels upon the removal of the AD measure if the imposing country offers a suf-
ficiently large enough market to at least offset the costs that need to be (re-)invested 
to (re-)enter the foreign market as an exporter. By contrast, if exporters do not see 
enough market potential to cover their market entry costs, re-entry might not be 
profitable for targeted countries any longer, even after the revocation of AD. Hence, 
the imposition of an AD measure would more likely lead to a long-term disturbance 
of a trade relationship if the imposing country has relatively little market potential. 
This negative perspective might be relevant especially to most developing countries 
which are often characterized by (economically) small domestic markets, thus pro-
viding less entrepreneurial incentive for targeted exporters to re-establish trade rela-
tions upon the removal of AD.
In order to test whether there are differences in the post-revocation trade effects 
with respect to imposing country classifications, we estimate equation (1) separately 
for (a) traditional versus new users, and for (b) large versus small domestic markets 
on the imposing country side.10 Estimation results are displayed in Table 8, and gen-
erally in line with our baseline findings: As indicated by the consistently negatively 
10 (a) The four traditional AD users are Australia, Canada, the EU, South Africa, and the United States. 
The remaining countries in our sample fall into the new users category. (b) We use the Global Competi-
tiveness Report’s Domestic Market Size Index, provided by the World Economic Forum (2017), to cate-
gorize imposing countries into “large” and “small”. More specifically, while the index ranges from 1 to 7 
(best), we sort sample countries by index points and classify the following countries as large: Argentina, 
Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the EU, India, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, 
Thailand, Turkey, and the United States. The remaining sample countries have been classified as small.
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signed and highly statistically significant coefficient estimates for our post-revoca-
tion dummy variable, the presence of long-run effects on trade resulting from the 
previous imposition of an AD measure seems to be independent of the characteris-
tics of imposing countries.
Confirming our above hypothesis, however, a simple magnitude comparison of 
the coefficients for the in-force and post-revocation dummy variables suggests a 
slight recovery to pre-intervention trade levels upon the removal of AD for large 
imposing countries in column (3) while this does not seem to be the case for small 
imposers in column (4). By implication, the long-term disturbances of imports aris-
ing from the imposition of AD thus seem to be more pronounced for the latter group 
of countries.11
4  A Theoretical Framework
What is the intuition for our finding that AD has a negative impact on bilateral trade 
which survives beyond its immediate revocation? In this section, we will discuss some 
underlying reasons and provide a micro-founded theoretical framework to analyze the 
long-term effects of AD and trade. Since our theoretical framework is constructed at the 
firm level as opposed to the product-level empirical data, we are not providing precise 
identification, but rather a useful framework which allows us to be more specific about 
the underlying reasons for our empirical results. We discuss several issues in turn.
Table 8  Estimation results by imposing country
Estimations based on sample splits (see text for details). Asterisks denote the level of statistical signifi-
cance with *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, and † p<0.1. Robust, clustered (at the country-pair-prod-
uct level) standard errors in parentheses. Country-pair-product, country-pair-year, and country-year-prod-
uct fixed effects always included but not reported
Traditional user New user Large market Small market
(1) (2) (3) (4)
AD −0.510∗∗∗ −0.378∗∗∗ −0.404∗∗∗ −0.559∗∗∗
(0.0700) (0.0676) (0.0489) (0.121)
Post-revocation −0.338∗∗∗ −0.193∗∗ −0.284∗∗∗ −0.570∗∗∗
(0.0723) (0.0678) (0.0487) (0.124)
Tariff −0.317† −0.563∗∗∗ −0.593∗∗∗ −0.557∗∗∗
(0.167) (0.0775) (0.0915) (0.109)
Constant 13.29∗∗∗ 12.26∗∗∗ 13.05∗∗∗ 11.83∗∗∗
(0.00692) (0.00661) (0.00667) (0.00803)
Observations 815,414 2,348,717 1,881,191 1,303,882
R2
adj
0.894 0.852 0.872 0.844
11 This interpretation is supported by unreported estimations in which we interact both policy dummy 
variables with a country group indicator. These estimations reveal that, relative to large imposers, small 
imposing countries experience a significantly higher severity of especially the post-revocation trade 
effects (results are available upon request).
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First, acknowledging the argumentation in Pauwels et al. (2001) and Besedes and 
Prusa (2017), our findings could reflect that AD might create a protectionist signal. 
The fear of further AD measures at some point in the future, might act as an impedi-
ment to bilateral trade returning to pre-intervention levels following revocation.
Second, an alternative, rather intuitive explanation for the negatively signed 
coefficient estimate of the post-revocation policy dummy variable could be that 
targeted firms raise their prices while being subject to AD in order to buy them-
selves relief. While this strategy may lead to the removal of the trade impediment, 
this could prevent a recovery of previously affected trade, and in turn cause lasting 
trade responses. In this respect, Blonigen and Haynes (2002) and Sandkamp (2020) 
find that said upward price adjustments of targeted exporters remain even after 
the removal of AD.
Third, we hypothesize that post-revocation trade effects may occur due to firm 
exit in the imposing country, or from underinvestment on the part of targeted firms 
in the imposing countries. We could see such investment as improved distribution, 
storage, logistics or marketing. We will devote the remainder of this section to the 
analysis of a micro-founded theoretical model to account for AD induced exit and 
underinvestment.
The explicit modelling of AD trade protection inevitably presents some chal-
lenges, however. Under normal circumstances the unique feature of AD is its 
dependence on the price of exports relative to the price charged domestically. Mod-
elling AD in this way would not be a trivial exercise but more importantly, however, 
it is not necessary to demonstrate how the protection would produce lasting effects 
upon trade. For this reason, we model AD protection as a standard trade policy 
instrument, while acknowledging the shortcomings of this approach.
We assume there is a set N of potential firms with a subset m ∈ N of active firms 
who compete in the familiar Cournot model of quantity competition in the market 
of country A.12 There are three periods, where period T − 2 serves as an initial con-
dition. We trace the effects of AD in period T − 1 and its revocation in period T. 
The targeted firm B is located in country B, and the remaining firms are assumed to 
be domestic firms located in country A, the AD imposing country, indexed as Aj.13 
Domestic firms produce output at marginal cost cA ∀ Aj whereas firm B produces at 
marginal cost cB . We may assume cB < cA , although we shall demonstrate below that 
lasting trade responses may occur even without this assumption. We assume a sim-
ple linear inverse demand function p = a − Q , where Q is the sum of the outputs of 
all active firms. We do not model output destined for countries other than A. Oper-
ating profits of a typical firm i (which indexes firm B and domestic firms Aj) with 
marginal cost ci in period t are equal to:
12 Our framework has been adapted from Baldwin (1990) who analyzes persistence in the entry deci-
sions of firms. In particular, he shows how firms, following their entry into a market, do not exit in the 
face of adverse economic conditions to avoid losing market share. Similar models are found in Bald-
win (1988) and Baldwin and Krugman (1989). Our model, however, demonstrates how a firm may be 
deterred from re-entry or how its investment decision is hampered by a temporary trade impediment.
13 This last assumption is not essential and, without loss of generality, we could alternatively assume 
these firms had various locations across several non-targeted countries.
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where D is a dummy variable which equals unity if country A levies an AD duty 
equal to  on imports from firm B, and zero otherwise. Our framework allows post-
revocation trade effects to occur due to exit of the targeted firm as well as due to 
insufficient investment in fixed costs. We will begin by defining exit thresholds. In 
our benchmark model, we shall assume that the free trade equilibrium involves n − 1 
domestic firms and firm B serving market A. We derive conditions under which AD 
induces exit of firm B and entry of the nth domestic firm in period T − 1 . Lasting 
trade destruction arises when firm B is unable to re-enter in period T where the AD 
duty is lifted.
4.1  Exit Thresholds
Firms incur fixed entry costs which must be paid in the period of entry denoted Ei , 
i = A,B , where it is assumed EB ≥ EA and EAj = EA ∀ j. That is, typical entry costs 
which may include initial set-up costs of marketing, distribution, storage and reputa-
tion might be larger when operating overseas. Once the firm has entered the market 
it must incur fixed per-period costs denoted Fi , i = A,B , where FB ≥ FA in all sub-
sequent periods, where FAj = FA ∀ j. Such fixed costs may be related to the mainte-
nance of marketing, distribution, storage and reputation. We further assume Ei > Fi 
∀ i = A,B . In order to focus the analysis on trade, we rule out the possibility for 
firm B to serve the market in A through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The assets 
acquired through investment in entry and operating costs ( Ei and Fi ) are assumed to 
be entirely firm-specific and have no resale value (sunk costs). Firms discount the 
future by  . As such, assuming a firm enters in period T − 2 and remains active in 
periods T − 1 and T, the present discounted value of profits of firm i with marginal 
cost ci are:
Free trade
We first solve for equilibrium values under the assumption of free trade before 
moving onto the possibility of AD. In the free trade benchmark, we assume that 
taste and cost parameters are such that there is only room for n firms – firm B and 
n − 1 domestic firms. We use backward induction to solve for output under free trade 
in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We provisionally assume that entry of n + 1 
firms occurs, then solve for equilibrium outputs and ask which firms would find it 
profitable to enter. The profit-maximizing solution obtained by optimization of (2) 
yields the following per-period equilibrium outputs for, respectively, firm Aj and 
firm B, assuming n + 1 firms are active:













t(pt − ci + D)qit − Ei − (1 + )Fi, i = A,B.
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The assumption of linear demand implies that per-period operating profits of firms in 






)2 . The condition which guarantees firm B is 















− EB − (1 + )FB ≥ 0 . 















− EA − (1 + )FA ≥ 0   . We can now define thresholds that determine 
which firms are active under free trade. The nth firm in A does not enter under free 
trade if and only if:






 . Firm B is active under free trade if and only if:








We model AD as a standard trade policy instrument — an import tariff denoted  
— which is levied in period T − 1 and removed in period T on imports from firm B. 
In the benchmark model, we assume the import tariff will prohibit imports from firm 
B in period T − 1 . We derive the threshold level of the import tariff which induces 
exit of firm B by computing equilibrium outputs when all firms are active, then solve 
for the level of  which leaves firm B with strictly negative present discounted prof-
its. With the conditions on the cost parameters for cA and cB , respectively, in (5) and 
(6) assumed true, our initial condition involves firm B being active along with n − 1 
domestic firms in period T − 2 . Optimization of (2), yields the following equilib-
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We can express the present discounted value of profits of firm B in periods T − 1 and 










 −(1 + )FB , and hence, this firm exits in period 
T − 1 if and only if:14
If the tariff exceeds this threshold, firm B exits and the nth inactive firm in country A gets 
an opportunity to enter, and will do so if and only if the present discounted value of its 










− FA − EA:15
If conditions (8) and (9) hold, the sector will not return to the free trade equilibrium 
in period T when the AD duty is revoked. The nth domestic firm in A will have 
replaced firm B in period T. In this scenario, the entry of the inefficient domestic 
firm delivers trade effects which last beyond the removal of AD.
The assumption that firm A is less efficient than firm B is not necessary for this 
result, however. In fact, an alternative scenario is based on multiple equilibria. Sup-
pose all firms in A and firm B are identical in terms of marginal cost (cA = cB ≡ c) . 
Suppose initially, that is in period T − 2 , firm B and n − 1 domestic firms are active, 
and that consumer taste and cost parameters ensure that only n firms can be active 
at the same time. Similar to the case analyzed formally above, it is possible that 
the protection the AD duty offers in period T − 1 leads to the exit of firm B and 
the entry of the nth firm in A, such that when the duty is revoked, the foreign firm, 
which exited in response to the protective measure, cannot re-enter while making 
non-negative profits. In this case, the sector moves from one equilibrium in which 
only firm B and n − 1 domestic firms are active to another equilibrium in which n 
domestic firms are active.
4.2  Fixed‑Cost Thresholds
In the cases studied thus far, post-revocation trade effects of AD come about due to 
the exit of firm B and its inability to re-enter (make non-negative profit) once the 
AD duty is revoked. Lasting trade effects may also occur, however, without affect-
ing the number of foreign firms. We now propose an alternative scenario in which 
firms endogenously choose the scale of production. In particular, firms face a choice 
of  incurring higher fixed costs in exchange for lower marginal costs. There is one 
firm located in country B labelled firm B and n firms located in country A labeled 
(8)























14 We use the equilibrium output in period T under free trade assuming there are n − 1 active domestic 
firms.
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Aj. We assume all firms are active in three periods such that there are no entry or 
exit decisions. Suppose in period T − 1 , firm B and firm Aj, respectively, have the 
opportunity to invest a fixed cost, GB and GA , in addition to the fixed cost required to 
remain active, respectively, FB and FA . Such investment can be seen as improved dis-
tribution, storage, logistics or marketing. The investment is assumed to be durable 
for two periods and incurring it allows a firm to produce at half marginal cost in the 
current period, 1
2
cB , and at zero marginal cost in the following period. For simplic-
ity, and without loss of generality, we assume that our parameter range ensures that 
it is profitable for firm Aj to incur the investment GA . We once again analyze the two 
regimes of free trade and anti-dumping, respectively.
Free trade
Under free trade firm B will make this investment if and only if:
We continue to assume the linear demand function p = a − Q . We optimize (2) with 
respect to outputs and then plug the resulting equilibrium outputs into (10), not-
ing that equilibrium profit is output squared. Under free trade, firm B will make the 
additional investment if and only if:
Anti-dumping
Under AD, using similar steps, we can solve for the threshold level of GB for 
which the foreign firm will make the additional investment. Firm B invests if and 
only if:






 for 𝜏 > 0 , implying that under free trade, the foreign 
firm can afford to incur a higher cost of the efficiency-enhancing technology. The 
AD measure may have lasting effects, since after the revocation of said measure, 
underinvestment in fixed costs may leave output short of its free trade level in the 




















































16 Notice that our model allows for the possibility that the output of firm B is lower after revocation than 
while the AD duty was in force. To see this, suppose firm B had not incurred the fixed cost GB . Then 
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5  Concluding Remarks
Within the past 25 years, AD policy has evolved into a widely applied trade barrier 
of both high-income countries and emerging market economies. While its original 
intention was to prevent or offset price dumping in international trade, a large body 
of literature has given rise to the concern that AD may simply be another protectionist 
measure in the set of trade policy tools. In view of the extensive utilization of AD, this 
paper aims to contribute to our understanding of the potential long-term consequences 
of such measures.
Using bilateral trade values at the HS4 level of aggregation, we empirically identify 
adverse impacts of AD which survive well beyond its revocation. Taking into account 
the variation in duration of individual AD cases does not alter this interpretation, i.e., 
the persistence of the adverse trade effects seems to be inherent regardless of the dura-
tion of AD measures. Our findings withstand a further differentiation by the time of 
their imposition and revocation, economic sector and the nature of imposing countries. 
From a global trade policy perspective, temporary trade barriers may thus be consid-
ered far more concerning than previous studies have suggested. Against the backdrop 
of current protectionist tendencies, policy-makers should apply an even greater cau-
tion in terms of using AD than might currently be the case. Based on our findings, 
the uncritical application of AD seems to come at a yet unforeseen sacrifice, on the 
sides of targeted firms but also imposing countries. More specifically, while the for-
mer are faced with the permanent loss of (potentially important) export destinations, 
the latter run the risk of compromising lasting welfare due to restricting cost-effective 
imports. Moreover, while our findings are based on the analysis of bilateral trade, they 
have larger implications for world trade as a whole. Today, around 80% of world trade 
takes place along GVCs. The organization of subsequent production steps across mul-
tiple supply and processing firms at home and abroad means, however, that even minor 
interruptions might entail serious consequences.
This paper provides considerable empirical evidence on the long-run effects of AD 
on trade flows. A number of limitations, however, remain unaddressed which leaves 
ample room for future research questions. For instance, what are the potential implica-
tions of lasting trade destruction on third countries? Do domestic producers in imposing 
countries take over once foreign exporters are forced out of the market? Neither does 
our analysis allow for an overall assessment of AD policy where, in some cases, AD 
may even function as an effective import substitution instrument to increase domestic 
output and promote employment.
Footnote 16 (continued)
which can be either positive or negative. This implies that under our assumptions, there is the possibility 
that output might drop even further even after revocation simply because firm B had not committed suf-
ficient fixed costs (invested GB ) in the market of country A.
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